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THE ART OF FRISKINGt
JOSEPH G. COOK*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE effectiveness of a system of law enforcement is manifested as
significantly in its success in preventing criminal behavior as in its
ability to apprehend and convict offenders. To the extent a law enforce-
ment officer can intercept contemplated criminal activity before it reaches
fruition, society has benefited.1 To sanction such preventive action, how-
ever, entails an accommodation of fourth amendment protections to permit
intrusions upon personal security under circumstances short of probable
cause to arrest.
The power to temporarily detain individuals suspected of engaging in
criminal activity was accorded constitutional legitimacy in Terry v. Ohio.2
Beyond the authority to temporarily detain,' the Court in Terry recognized
that the circumstances confronting the officer at the time could provide
justification for a cursory pat-down, or "frisk"' for weapons. Again, such
official conduct does not require probable cause in the traditional sense
and, whatever may be said regarding the insignificance of a limited field
detention, a frisk cannot so easily be dismissed as a "petty indignity"
undeserving of constitutional scrutiny.'
This article is an amplification of a portion of a treatise tentatively entitled "Constitu-
tional Rights of the Accused," to be published by the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing
Company.
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. Professor Cook received his B.A and J.D.
from the University of Alabama, where he was a member of the editorial board of the Law
Review, and his LL.M. from Yale Law School
1. For example, while the defendant in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was arrested
and convicted for the illegal possession of a concealed weapon, assuming the officers appre-
hensions were correct, an armed robbery was prevented.
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. See Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 287
(1971); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Be-
yond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40 (1968).
4. 392 U.S. at 17. The Court quoted from Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming
Criminals, 45 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954): "'[Tlhe officer must feel with sensitive
fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the pris..
oner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and
entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" 392 U.S. at 17 n.13.
5. "It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly:' Id. at 17
(footnote omitted).
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Constitutional concern, however, is not limited to the immediate invasion
of personal integrity but further attaches to the snowballing effect which
has typically been the result in virtually every case involving frisking
which reaches the appellate level. By establishing that degree of suspicion
constitutionally mandated, an officer is entitled to temporarily detain a
suspect. If he may reasonably fear for his own safety, a superficial pat-
down for weapons may be carried out. If the pat-down reasonably leads
the officer to believe the suspect possesses a deadly weapon, he has
probable cause to arrest for such possession. If he can make a legal arrest,
a thorough search of the person of the arrestee is permissible.0
This article focuses upon the developing standards of constitutional
reasonableness in the practice of frisking. For purposes of analysis the
discussion examines the basic constitutional standard fostered by Terry,
the problems concerned with the decision to initiate a frisk, and the
propriety of subsequent actions by the officer once the frisk is carried out.
II. TmE Terry CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
The employment of frisking as an investigative tool did not, of course,
begin with Terry but had been recognized by the common law' and
occasionally codified. 8 Nevertheless, for the technique to receive endorse-
ment by the Supreme Court inevitably had a profound impact. Not only
was all doubt removed from the minds of law enforcement officers and
their advisors in regard to the admissibility of evidence secured as a result
of such practices, but more important, as the spate of post-Terry decisions
concerning frisking demonstrated, appellate courts were provided with a
basis for presumptive legitimacy in field detention cases, allowing them
to explore with greater particularity the varied factual patterns to which
Terry does not provide clear responses.
In Terry a plainclothes detective was patrolling a downtown area
of Cleveland when his attention was attracted by two men standing on a
corner.' After observing their movements for ten or twelve minutes,
6. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
7. See L. Tiffany, D. McIntyre, Jr. & D. Rotenberg, Detection of Crime 45-48 (1967);
Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. Crim. L.C. &
P.S. 532 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 108-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1970); La. Code Crim. Pro.
Ann. art. 215.1 (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50 (McKinney 1971).
9. The Court accepted with equanimity the testimony of the officer that he merely
sensed that the two were up to no good. Noting that the officer had thirty-nine years
experience as a policeman, the Court left no doubt that it would honor such experience
and expertise in appraising the reasonableness of the conclusions and actions of an officer.
392 U.S. at S.
[Vol. 40
1972] ART OF FRISKING
including their peering into a store window several times and consulting
a third party, the officer became convinced that the men were planning a
robbery and decided to investigate the matter further. He identified him-
self and asked the suspects their names. Receiving a mumbled response,
the officer grabbed the petitioner, spun him around, placed him between
himself and the other two suspects, and patted down the outside of his
clothing, detecting what he took to be a gun in the breast pocket of the
petitioner's overcoat. The officer then reached inside the pocket but was
unable to remove the weapon. He removed the petitioner's overcoat and
found a .38 caliber revolver in the pocket. The petitioner was convicted
of carrying a concealed weapon.10 In upholding the frisk as reasonable,
the Court was not content to distinguish such methods from a full-blown
search." Considering the problem within the context of the fourth amend-
ment, the question remained whether the conduct of the officer under
the circumstances was reasonable. - It did not follow that because the
officer has reason to briefly detain the suspect under suspicious circum-
stances, the authority to frisk was an automatic concomitant thereof. As
stated by the Court: "[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger."' 3 Applying this standard to the facts, the
Court concluded that the action taken by the officer was reasonable.'4
10. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
11. "[It is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a
careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in
an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.'" 392 U.S. at 16.
12. "[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Id. at 21-22 (dta-
tions omitted).
13. Id. at 27 (citations omitted). Cf. Harlan, J., concurring: "Where such a stop is reason-
able... the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as
here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.. . .There is no reason why an officer,
rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask
one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet." Id. at 33. See also
United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969); People v. Collins, 1 Cal. 3d
658, 463 P.2d 403, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1970); People v. Griffith, 19 CaL App. 3d 948, 97
Cal. Rptr. 367 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Adam, 1 Cal. App. 3d 486, 81 Cal. Rptr.
738 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311, 258 N.E.2d 703, 310 N.YS.2d
292, cert. denied, 400 U.S 960 (1970); Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 263 A.2d
342 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969).
14. "At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden
bad reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was
necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the
true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized." 392 U.S. at 30.
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The power approved by Terry is a carefully circumscribed power and
may not be interpreted as a general license for personal searches. Its
limitations were made abundantly clear in Sibron v. New York, 15 decided
the same day as Terry.'" In Sibron the officer, having observed the suspect
conversing with several known narcotics addicts, approached him and
said: " 'You know what I am after.' "11 At this point, according to the
officer, Sibron "'mumbled something and reached into his pocket.' ,18
Simultaneously the officer reached into the same pocket and came out
with several envelopes of heroin. Lacking probable cause to make an
arrest, the Court held that the action of the officer constituted an illegal
search rather than a frisk, and therefore the evidence was inadmissible.
As the officer did not contend that when Sibron put his hand in his pocket
he feared that he was going for a weapon, the response was viewed as a
search for narcotics, which was not reasonable under the circumstances."0
The immediate impact of Terry has been a forthright recognition of the
constitutional authority to frisk under appropriate circumstances. 0 Never-
theless, the constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine are most fragile,
and dissimilar factual situations must be approached with circumspection.
15. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
16. A companion case, Peters v. New York, was also decided in the same opinion. There
the Court found probable cause for arrest and an incidental search, and thus the power to
frisk was not of significance. Sibron and Peters both involved the New York stop-and-
frisk law (now N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50 (McKinney 1971)) but the Court avoided any
consideration of the constitutionality of the statute.
17. 392 U.S. at 45.
18. Id.
19. "The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on
the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a
citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds
for doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to
point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed
and dangerous." 392 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted). See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 89 (1968).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Okla. 1970); People v.
Tarkington, 273 Cal. App. 2d 466, 78 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Wil-
liams, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); Modesto v.
State, 258 A.2d 287 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969); Jones v. United States, 260 A.2d 674 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1970); Alexander v. State, 225 Ga. 358, 168 SXE.2d 315 (1969); People v. Tas-
sone, 41 Ill. 2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 (1969); Hayes v.
Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1970); Cleveland v. State, 8 Md. App. 204, 259 A.2d
73 (1969); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 355 Mass. 378, 244 N.E.2d 908 (1969); People
v. Ramos, 17 Mich. App. 515, 170 N.W.2d 189 (1969); Johnson v. State, 464 P.2d 465
(Nev. 1970); People v. Joslin, 32 App. Div. 2d 859, 301 N.Y.S.2d 212 (3d Dep't 1969);
Carter v. State, 445 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Henneke, 470 P.2d 176
(Wash. 1970).
ART OF FRISKING
III. INI TnNG THE FlisK
A. Identifying the Suspect
In justifying a pat-down search, as in other instances of fourth amend-
ment intrusions, reasonableness does not turn upon whether the officer's
beliefs were borne out. Thus, if probable cause is objectively present at
the time an arrest is consummated, should it subsequently be determined
that the arrestee was in no way connected with the subject of the arrest,
the arrest is still legal, and should otherwise incriminating evidence be
divulged in the process, its subsequent use is constitutionally permissible.2 1
Similarly, the reasonableness of a pat-down does not turn upon whether a
weapon was actually discovered. If sufficient reasons are present to
warrant a frisk, its fruitlessness is immaterial to the validity of an arrest
which is the end result of other fortuitous occurrences. --
A more perplexing problem is presented, however, when an officer has
adequate grounds for the frisk of an individual, but he is unable to single
out who it is. This improbable dilemma confronted the officers in Gaskins
v. United States,2s where a cab driver hailed them and reported that he
had just observed "'a guy up the street tuck a gun inside his belt.' ",
The officers proceeded in the direction indicated and found three men
walking together, any one of whom could have been the culprit. No one
else was on the street. All three parties were patted down, and incriminat-
ing evidence was found on each -5 In upholding the action of the officers,
the court reasoned that there were but two options open to them: "(a) let
the three pass in the night because [they were] not told which one of the
three had a gun and therefore may have lacked legal authority to search
any of them, or (b) stop the three and determine which, if any, was
carrying a weapon." 20 Given these alternatives, the court concluded that
the action taken was not unreasonable. -2 7
While the issue did not arise in the case, an additional complication
could result from a consecutive, as opposed to a concurrent, pat-down
of the three suspects. If the gun alluded to by the taxi driver had been
revealed by the first frisk, the question arises as to whether a further frisk
21. The author has discussed cases in which this issue has arisen in Cook, Probable
Cause to Arrest, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 317, 319-21 (1971).
22. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 71-85 infra.
23. 262 A.2d 810 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
24. Id. at 811.
25. One of the suspects had a pistol, the second a knife, and the third narcotics para-
phernalia. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 812. See also United States v. Frye, 271 A.2d 788 (D.C. CL App. 1970).
1972]
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of the remaining parties would be unreasonable. Should three officers be
present, a simultaneous frisk of the three would seem the safest and most
reasonable approach." It is doubtful that reasonableness should hinge on
the availability of law enforcement forces. Furthermore, where three
individuals are identified as a group and a weapon is discovered in the
possession of one of them, there would appear to be a reasonable appre-
hension on the part of the officer that the suspect's compatriots might also
be armed.2
B. The Sequence of Events
The juxtaposition of Terry and Sibron suggests that for stop and frisk
tactics to be constitutionally permissible the prosecution must be able to
demonstrate a step-by-step escalation of reasonable belief on the part of
the investigating officer culminating in a seizure of evidence. The
authority given does not lend itself to shortcuts. For example, in United
States v. Cunningham31 the prosecution contended that while an arrest
and a search occurred, the court need not concern itself with the question
of probable cause. The prosecution reasoned that had the officer at the
outset merely detained the suspect, the circumstances were such that a
frisk would have been justified. A frisk would have disclosed a concealed
weapon, at which point an arrest and search would have been reasonable
under the authority of Terry. Thus, it was argued, the fact that the officer
bypassed the preliminary steps was immaterial. The court found such an
after-the-fact rationalization unacceptable, relying upon the traditional
principle that a search cannot be legitimized by its results . 2
28. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1968), where officers simultaneously searched
three levels of a residence for the suspect and weapons. The seizures were held incident to
the arrest, without inquiry as to the actual temporal sequence, since there was probable
cause to arrest at the time of entry.
29. See United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court stated:
"We think that Terry recognizes and common sense dictates that the legality of such a
limited intrusion into a citizen's personal privacy extends to a criminal's companions at the
time of arrest. It is inconceivable that a peace officer effecting a lawful arrest of an occu-
pant of a vehicle must expose himself to a shot in the back from defendant's associate
because he cannot, on the spot, make the nice distinction between whether the other is a
companion in crime or a social acquaintance. All companions of the arrestee within the im-
mediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the officer, are constitu-
tionally subjected to the cursory 'pat-down' reasonably necessary to give assurance that
they are unarmed." Id. at 1193.
30. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra. See also People v. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d 272, 269
N.E.2d 488 (1971).
31. 424 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914 (1970).
32. Id. at 943. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). See also People
v. Rice, 259 Cal. App. 2d 399, 66 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
[Vol. 40
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However, an inconsistent result was reached in People v. Baker.' The
manager of a bowling alley informed an officer that an attendant had
observed a patron place packets of white powder and a pistol in a handbag
which had been deposited in a locker at the bowling alley. He further
advised him that he had personally examined the contents of the locker
and could confirm the attendant's report. Additional officers were sent
to the bowling alley, the contents of the locker examined by them, the
pistol removed and the remaining items returned to the locker. About a
half hour later, the defendant opened the locker, removed the handbag,
and was arrested as he attempted to leave. He was immediately searched,
and a pistol was recovered from his waistband. The court conceded that
the prior search of the locker by the officers was unreasonable under the
fourth amendment.34 The defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the locker,35 which was improperly invaded by the search.
Therefore, the search was prima facie illegal, and probable cause for the
arrest was a fruit of the illegal search and likewise would appear to be
constitutionally intolerable. The same would hold true as to all evidence
which was obtained incident to the arrest. However, the initial obser-
vations of the attendant, and the independent search of the manager did
not raise constitutional problems, as it did not entail governmental
action 6 This information, if given to the officers, would have been
sufficient for them to detain the defendant after he removed the contents
of the locker and subject him to a Terry-frisk. Had this been done, it
would have disclosed the second pistol in the defendant's waistband. At
this point, the officers would have had probable cause to arrest the de-
fendant and carry out an incident search, including a search of the hand-
bag. Thus, the ultimate result would be factually identical to the actual
outcome of this case. The arrest and search was therefore not tainted by
the prior illegal search. The result in this case would be problematical
had there not been a second pistol found on the person of the suspect. To
sustain the police activity, the court would either have had to extend the
scope of the frisk to include the handbag, or give effect to an alternative
theory the court suggested, i.e., that the reliable report of a pistol in the
locker created a sufficient danger to justify a warrantless search3 7 In
either instance, the judicially tolerated intrusion would appear to go
beyond prevailing constitutional standards. 38
33. 12 Cal. App. 3d 826, 90 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Dist. CL App. 1970).
34. Id. at 833-34, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15.
35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
37. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 837-39, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16.




IV. Thx PRODUCT OF THE FmIsK
A. Tactile Sensations Produced by the Pat-Down
It will be a rare case in which, in the process of a pat-down, an officer will
not come upon some object or objects secreted in the apparel of the suspect.
Obviously not all sensed objects create reasonable suspicion of the
presence of a weapon. Thus, an object shaped like a wallet detected in a
hip pocket or a breast coat pocket is more than likely just that. Similarly,
writing instruments may be anticipated in shirt pockets, and coins and
key containers in trouser pockets. Absent special circumstances, the
sensing of such objects should not be cause for increased apprehensiveness
on the part of the officer. Thus, in People v. Bueno8" the removal of some
keys and a gold ring from the pocket of a suspect was found unwarranted.
However, the seizure of a cigarette lighter was found reasonable in Taylor
v. Superior Court4" because it "could be used in a doubled up fist as a
punch or thrown at the officer or used to burn the officer or the police
unit."'" The nature of the clothing worn by the suspect may increase the
difficulty in ascertaining the identity of a felt object, a factor which the
court may consider in determining reasonableness.42
It would seem clear that the detection of any "bulge" in the clothing
of the suspect is not adequate justification for an arrest and incident
search.43 It is conceivable, however, that in the process of frisking, the
officer may detect proof of the commission of an offense other than the
possession of a dangerous weapon. For example, because of the close
proximity of the officer to the suspect, he might detect the unmistakable
odor of marijuana. If coupled with this the officer feels what from his
experience he believes to be a familiar container for marijuana, there
would appear to be an arguable case of probable cause to arrest."
39. 475 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1970).
40. 275 Cal. App. 2d 146, 79 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
41. Id. at 150, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
42. People v. Watson, 12 Cal. App. 3d 130, 90 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(long-stemmed smoking pipe reasonably suspected to be a weapon when felt within a
jacket made of heavy material).
43. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. 583, 280 A.2d 816 (1971).
44. People v. Rice, 259 Cal. App. 2d 399, 402 n.1, 66 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 n.1 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1968). The detection of glass in a pocket may reasonably be feared. People v. Garcia,
274 Cal. App. 2d 100, 78 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); cf. People v. Gonzales, 17
Cal. App. 3d 848, 95 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971), where the officer detected a
bulge which was comparable to cellophane bags of narcotics found on arrestees earlier the
same night. The court held that since the prior arrests had been illegal, the officer could




Cases involving the nature of the "bulge" have been most prevalent in
California. In People v. Artnenta45 the defendant was stopped by officers
after he had allegedly committed several traffic violations. After giving
the officer his driver's license upon request, the defendant appeared to be
hiding something. The officer requested that he get out of the car, at
which time the odor of alcohol was detected, and the officer decided to
administer a sobriety test. At this point he noticed a bulge in the de-
fendant's trousers just beneath the belt. A pat-down was commenced,
and upon reaching the bulge the officer inquired as to what it was. The
defendant thereupon shoved the officer back and started to place his hand
within his trousers. The officer prevented this and again asked what the
bulge was. Again the defendant forcibly resisted, and the officer reached
into the trousers and retrieved two containers of heroin wrapped in paper.
The defendant argued that the bulge was made by a "soft object," and
that only the discovery of a "hard object" could justify an intrusive
search. The court rejected the distinction as too simplistic, musing that
by this argument "a rubber water pistol loaded with carbolic acid or
some other liquid, which if used by a suspect could permanently blind
an officer, should be protected from a 'pat down search' because it is 'soft'
and not 'hard.' "I
The Armenta decision was repudiated by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in People v. Collins,47 where the court held that "[f]eeling a soft
object in a suspect's pocket during a pat-down, absent unusual circum-
stances, does not warrant an officer's intrusion into a suspect's pocket to
retrieve the object."4 s The court continued:
To permit officers to exceed the scope of a lawful pat-down whenever they feel a soft
object relying upon mere speculation that the object might be a razor blade concealed
in a handkerchief, a "sap," or any other atypical weapon would be to hold that posses-
sion of any object, including a wallet, invites a plenary search of an individual's
person.49
The court concluded it could not "condone fanciful speculations such as
that indulged in by Arinenta .... "" In the present case the court would
not abide the argument that a package of loosely packed marijuana could
45. 268 Cal. App. 2d 248, 73 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
46. Id. at 251, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 821. The court, had it wished, could have avoided the
issue of the reasonableness of the pat-down by holding simply that the probable cause to
arrest the suspect for traffic violations justified a search of his person.
47. 1 Cal. 3d 658, 463 P.2d 403, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1970).
48. Id. at 662, 463 P.2d at 406, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
49. Id. at 663, 463 P.2d at 406, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
50. Id., 463 P.2d at 407, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 183. But cf. People v. Crump, 14 Cal. App.
3d 547, 92 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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reasonably be suspected to be a weapon. 1 An inconsistent result appears
to have been reached in a Wisconsin decision, Ervin v. State," where a
packet of marijuana was found in the suspect's waistband, "not an unusual
hiding place for gun or knife.""
Notwithstanding Collins, incredible decisions continue to spring up in
California, a particularly interesting one being People v. Atmore." Con-
sidering the defendant to be a suspect in a murder case, the officer was
carrying out a cursory search for weapons when the defendant abruptly
grabbed his upper jacket pocket. The officer moved the hand away and
felt a round cylindrical object which he took to be a 12 gauge shotgun
shell. He thereupon reached into the pocket and removed the object,
which was a lipstick container. In his grasp was also a marijuana cigarette.
In order to sustain the legality of the seizure of the marijuana cigarette, it
was necessary to demonstrate that the seizure of the lipstick was reason-
able. Accepting the contention of the officer that he believed the object
to be a shotgun shell, the question remained what danger an isolated shell
would pose to the officer. The court noted the testimony of the officer that
a shotgun which could accommodate the shell could be as short as twenty
inches, and that such a weapon could have been concealed beneath the
defendant's jacket. This conclusion, however, is not in itself a satisfactory
explanation, as the shell would still not pose a danger until placed in the
chamber of the weapon. Presumably, if the defendant was also harboring
a shotgun this would be revealed before the completion of the pat-down.
Sensing the weakness in the argument, the court further submitted that
the shell could have been detonated by any sharp object, and while this
might seem a somewhat tenuous possibility, the officer thought he might
be coping with a desperate man, one who had recently committed a murder.
Thus the court concluded: "If he was the murder suspect, he might want
to explode the shell even in a way which might entail considerable per-
sonal risk to himself, so long as he might escape in the ensuing confusion.""
The fortuitous grasping of the marijuana cigarette was not an unreason-
able or surprising result, 6 and therefore the seizure was reasonable.
51. See also United States v. Gonzalez, 319 F. Supp. 563 (D. Conn. 1970) (the court
ignored the fact that here there had been an arrest rather than a mere stop); Morel v.
Superior Ct., 10 Cal. App. 3d 913, 89 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
52. 41 Wis. 2d 194, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968).
53. Id. at 204, 163 N.W.2d at 212.
54. 13 Cal. App. 3d 244, 91 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
55. Id. at 247, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
56. "We have all done the same thing when fumbling for keys or coins." Id. at 248, 91
Cal. Rptr. at 314. See also People v. Anthony, 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Dist.




B. Intensity of the Examination
Assuming the frisk produces sufficient reason to believe the suspect is
concealing a weapon, the possibility remains that upon removal the object
will prove to be ostensibly innocuous. At this point the reasonableness of
any further action of the officer is critical. A more intensive examination
of the item or items discovered would appear to be a relatively minor
invasion of privacy when compared to what has already transpired. Still,
the sole justification for the frisk is self-protection, and that end has been
accomplished. In Taylor v. Superior Court 7 the defendant was stopped
for a traffic violation and directed by the officer to empty his pockets, s
revealing a cigarette lighter. Upon request, the defendant handed the
lighter to the officer who opened it and discovered a usable quantity of
hashish. The court found this further examination reasonable because the
officer was properly concerned with the possibility that the lighter was a
container for razor blades.59 A comparable result was reached in State v.
Campbell"0 where a bulge turned out to be a large envelope, within which
the officer discovered illegal lottery slips. In sustaining the examination
of the contents of the envelope, the court conceded the possibility of the
presence of weapons.6 Again in People v. Weitzer,2 in the process of a
frisk, the officer felt a protruding object in the suspect's pants pocket
which did not appear to be a weapon. He asked the suspect what it was,
to which the latter responded that it was a letter he had forgotten to mail.
As the officer knew it was clearly not that, he removed it from the pocket
57. 275 Cal. App. 2d 146, 79 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Dist. CL App. 1969).
58. This, of course, exceeds the scope of authority per Terry, but since an arrest had
been made, a search of the suspect was permissible. However, as the subject of the arrest
was an automobile mechanical violation, the search was only justifiable for the purpose of
discovering weapons, so the decision to examine the interior of the lighter is analogous to
the decision to reach within the garments of the suspect following a Terry pat-down.
59. Given the possibility, it remains arguable whether razor blades secreted within a
cigarette lighter pose an immediate threat to the officer. See State v. Woodford, 26 Ohio
Misc. 51, 57-58, 269 N.E.2d 143, 148, 55 Ohio Op. 2d 174, 178 (Shaker Hts. Mun. Ct. 1971)
("The arresting officer stated that his reason for searching the hat vas because he had'
previous experiences with prisoners secreting razor blades in their hats. We do not doubt
that possibility, but cannot agree that possession of a usual type of razor blade would con-
stitute possession of a weapon; whether carried in one's hat or other apparel. If such were
the case, on frequent occasions those of us who do not subscribe to the fashion of wearing
beards, might find ourselves under arrest for carrying a package of 'concealed weapons' on
our way from the neighborhood drugstore or supermarket.").
60. 53 N.J. 230, 250 A.2d 1 (1969).
61. "It might well have contained a weapon, such as a thin knife or blade ... . Id.
at 238, 250 A.2d at 5.
62. 269 Cal. App. 2d 274, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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and found, inside an envelope, a matchbox containing marijuana. The
court found the search and seizure reasonable."
A variation of this problem arose in United States v. Dowling.0' If an
officer in good faith believes that the suspect has a weapon in his posses-
sion, but upon reaching the pocket can tell without going further that he
was mistaken, is a removal of the contents of the pocket justified? In
Dowling, the officers were told by an observer that an individual wearing
a long black overcoat had a gun in his pocket and had gone down a nearby
alley. A person wearing a long black overcoat was confronted in the alley,
and in an ensuing pat-down one of the officers came upon a bulge in a
pocket and said: "I think I've got the gun." 5 He then reached into the
pocket and retrieved a three-by-five pad, numbers slips, a pencil, a piece
of carbon paper, and some currency. The suspect was then arrested for
possession of the numbers slips. Initially, a question may be raised as to
whether these objects could reasonably be mistaken for a gun in the pat-
down. It may be suggested that the expectation of the officer that the
suspect was armed should be considered in evaluating the reasonableness
of his conclusion. Nevertheless, once he reached within the pocket, it
became patently obvious that no pistol was to be found. The court, how-
ever, was not inclined to sub-divide the stages in the actions of the
officer this minutely. Once it was determined that reaching within the
pocket was justified, whatever was located therein could properly be
removed.6
C. Frustrating the Frisk
When circumstances are adequate to warrant a frisk for the determin-
ation of the presence of weapons, any effort on the part of the suspect to
frustrate the accomplishment of the pat-down may be countered by
reasonable actions on the part of the officer. In People v. Woods"7 the
63. "The falsehood, coupled with the unusualness of finding a matchbox wrapped in a
crumpled envelope, reasonably created the impression that the matchbox contained some-
thing that the defendant wished to conceal. The curiosity of a reasonable man, and, more cer-
tainly, the professional curiosity of a police officer, would properly be aroused. It was not
unreasonable for the officer to pursue the investigation which had taken a new turn be-
cause of the defendant's attempted concealment. It is well established that furtive conduct
evidenced by a body movement indicating that some object is being concealed in a vehicle
which is the subject of a traffic arrest will justify a search of that portion of the vehicle
where it appeared that the object was hidden." Id. at 292, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
64. 271 A.2d 406 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
65. Id. at 407 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 408.
67. 6 Cal. App. 3d 832, 86 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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suspect had his left hand concealed in a jacket pocket when the officer
approached. The officer placed his hand on the suspect's hand and asked
what he had in his pocket. When he failed to respond, the officer pulled
the suspect's hand out of the pocket. The hand was empty, but the pocket
was left standing open, and by shining his flashlight in it, the officer
observed a quantity of marijuana, for the possession of which the de-
fendant was arrested. The court found the officer's conduct reasonable
under the circumstances. 8
A unique problem was presented in Modesto v. State"a where, after a
chase, an automobile was stopped for speeding and the defendant, one of
two riders in the vehicle, was asked to get out. In the process, he removed
a trench coat he was wearing and dropped it on the seat behind him. This
impressed the officer as being unnatural as it was a cold night. He grabbed
the coat and found a pistol on the seat beneath it. The court held that the
seizure of the pistol was within the range of conduct permitted by Terry. 0
D. Iixrimin-ating Statements
The removal of items from the apparel of the suspect may be justified
by incriminating statements made during the pat-down. In patting down
the suspect in People v. Todd"' the officer came upon an unidentified bulge
in his rear pocket. At this point the suspect exclaimed: "You cannot
search me without a warrant even if I have a gun."72 The officer there-
upon retrieved the object which turned out to be a cigarete box containing
illegal narcotics. The court found that the reaction of the suspect raised
the officer's reasonable apprehensiveness to a point which would justify
the removal of the suspected bulge.7 Similarly, in People v. Leos,74 in
the process of a pat-down the officer noticed a large bulge in the suspect's
rear pants pocket. Before he proceeded to examine it, the suspect said:
"You got me. It's my weed."75Recognizing this as an admission to the
68. Query, would a comparable continuum of events have led to a different result in
Sibron? See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra. See also People v. Superior CL, 15 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 94 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Dist. CL App. 1971); State v. Dennis, 113 N.J. Super.
292, 273 A.2d 612 (App. Div. 1971); Almendarez v. State, 460 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
69. 258 A-2d 287 (Del. Super Ct. 1969).
70. "A person cannot avoid such a search of his clothing by removing his clothing when
it necessarily remains in the general vicinity where he is to remain." Id. at 288.
71. 2 Cal. App. 3d 389, 82 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Dist. CL App. 1969).
72. Id. at 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
73. Id. at 393-94, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 577. Cf. Amacher v. Superior CL, 1 Cal. App. 3d
150, 81 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Dist. CL App. 1969).
74. 265 Cal. App. 2d 822, 71 Cal. Rptr. 614 (Dist. CL App. 1968).
75. Id. at 824, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
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possession of marijuana, the court found the arrest and incident search
reasonable.76
Finally, in People v. Hubbard,77 an officer in the process of a legitimate
pat-down came upon what he suspected to be capsules in the pockets of the
suspect. Thereupon the officer asked him if he had any pills in his pocket,
and the suspect responded: "They're reds. They belong to my mother." 8
Then, upon the officer's request, the suspect gave him the pills. The court
found that the conduct of the officer was reasonable, and that the state-
ment provided probable cause for an arrest and an incident search.
Hubbard is distinguishable from the previously discussed decisions, and
therefore of more questionable constitutional validity, because the in-
criminating statement was not spontaneous but prompted by interrogation,
without prior Miranda warnings70 or any indication that the suspect was
not obliged to answer the question.8°Certainly without the incriminating
response there would have been an inadequate basis for an arrest. The
same problem was potentially present in People v. Adams' where, during
a pat-down, the officer detected "what appeared to be hand-rolled
cigarettes""2 in the suspect's shirt pocket. The officer asked the suspect
what was in his pocket to which he replied: "Papers." 3 The officer com-
mented that the "papers" were all rolled up and then asked how many
"sticks of weed" the suspect had, to which the latter responded, "Four. 8 4
He was then arrested and the marijuana cigarettes were removed from
76. Id. at 825, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 615. See generally United States ex rel. Moya v. Zelker,
329 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
77. 9 Cal. App. 3d 827, 88 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
78. Id. at 829, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
79. Miranda requires that prior to interrogation, a person in police custody must be
informed that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says might be used
against him in court, that he may consult a lawyer and have him present during the
interrogation, and that a lawyer will be appointed to represent him if he is unable to
afford one. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
80. It is not here suggested that Miranda warnings are required in the typical field
detention situation, even though a form of interrogation may occur. Nevertheless, where
the question is accusatory rather than merely inquiring, certainly the Escobedo "focus of
attention on the accused" level of suspicion has been reached. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490, 492 (1964). While the suspect has "an absolute right to remain silent," and
therefore probable cause to arrest could not be grounded on the exercise of the right, In
the present case the officer capitalized on the ignorance of the defendant of his privilege
to not respond and effectively induced a confession.
81. 1 Cal. App. 3d 486, 81 Cal. Rptr. 738 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).





his pocket."' The appellate court found an absence of facts which would
warrant a pat-down; thus it was unnecessary to reach the question whether
the officer had gone beyond the legitimate scope of such a procedure had
it been justified.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, as the Sibron decision so graphically illustrated, if the authority
to frisk is employed as a subterfuge to carry out a search, the evidence is
seized in violation of the fourth amendment.80 However, Terry and Sibron
remain the only Supreme Court decisions which provide guidance on the
constitutional limitations on frisking8 7 The bulk of decisions herein dis-
cussed lie somewhere between or without those holdings and an absence
of consistency would appear inevitable for the near future. Just as our
notions of probable cause to arrest have received increased clarity with
each Supreme Court decision evaluating a distinctive factual context, the
stop-and-frisk problem is likewise now lodged within the fluctuating
reasonableness standards of the fourth amendment. Cases factually dis-
tinguishable from those categorically ruled upon by the Court will fare
differently, just as reasonable men may differ.
The authority to frisk is unquestionably a significant intrusion on the
personal liberty and privacy of those subjected to it-a fact clearly
acknowledged in Terry.!' At the same time, the Court recognized that to
hold in-the-field confrontations under circumstances short of probable
cause to be violative of the fourth amendment would be a wholly un-
realistic and intolerable result.8" Having reasoned that far, a superficial
search solely for the protection of the life and safety of the officer could
hardly be denied. The Court took judicial notice of the potential for abuse
85. Id., 81 Ca]. Rptr. 738-39.
86. See, e.g., Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Collins,
439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. McIntyre, 304 F. Supp. 1244 (ED. La.
1969); United States v. Hostetter, 295 F. Supp. 1312 (D. DeL 1969); Cunha v. Superior
Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 352, 466 P.2d 704, 85 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1970); Irwin v. Superior CL, 1 Cal.
3d 423, 462 P.ad 12, 82 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1969); People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P2d
659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969); People v. Thomas, 16 Cal. App. 3d 231, 93 Cal. Rptr. 877
(Dist. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Hana, 7 Cal. App. 3d 664, 86 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Dist. CL
App. 1970); Amacher v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. App. 3d 150, 81 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969); Byrd v. Superior Ct., 268 Cal. App. 2d 495, 73 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968); People v. Britton, 264 Cal. App. 2d 711, 70 Cal. Rptr. 586 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
People v. Navran, 483 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1971).
87. In Morales v. New York, 396 US. 102, 104-05 (1969), the Court noted that Terry
had not authorized stationhouse detentions. No frisking problem was presented.
88. 392 US. at 16-17.
89. Id. at 15.
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that such an authority contained and conceded that to a large extent such
abuse would remain beyond the purview of the courts. 0 The precise
analysis of the continuum of events in both the Terry and Sibron cases
provides a clear indication that the Court expects this investigative tool
to be employed circumspectly, and any expansive employment of the
power is likely to be met with judicial rebuke.
90. Id. at 13-15.
